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I. INTRODUCTION

[A]ithough our wrongful death statute is remedial in nature and
must be liberally construed, we may not rewrite the statute in the
guise of construing it.'

Prior to 1969, West Virginia had not addressed the issue of whether an
unborn child2 could maintain a cause of action under our wrongful death statutd.
West Virginia's first attempt at addressing the issue came in the case of
Panagopoulous v. Martin,4 where the District Court for the Southern District of
West Virginia determined that a viable unborn child is a "person" within the
context of our wrongful death statute. Two years later, in Baldwin v. Butcher,
the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia adopted the holding in
Panagopoulousand allowed a wrongful death action to be maintained on behalf

Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I. 1976) (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
2 Throughout this Note, the terms "fetus" and "unborn child" will be used interchangeably.

My

use of either phrase is not meant to offend anyone. The use of either phrase is simply meant to
encompass all stages of development after conception. See Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W.
Va. 1995). I would also like to add that this Note is limited to unborn children who are "en ventre
sa mere." "En ventre sa mere" is defined as "[i]n its mother's womb." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
534 (6th ed. 1990). This Note will not address the issues that may arise with conception outside
the womb, nor the area of preconception torts.
3 W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1966) (current version at W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994)).

For the full

text of West Virginia's wrongful death statute, see infra part V.A.
4

295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D. W. Va. 1969).
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of a viable fetus.' By allowing wrongful death actions to be maintained on behalf
pushed West Virginia into alignment with the majority
of a viable fetus, Baldwin
6
of courts on this issue.
In late 1995, however, in the case of Farley v. Sartin,7 the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia decided to re-align our position on the issue of
whether wrongful death actions could be maintained by unborn children. In
Farley,the issue was whether a nonviable fetus8 could maintain such an action'
In a unanimous opinion, West Virginia became only the third jurisdiction in the
country to hold that a wrongful death action may be maintained on behalf of a
nonviable unborn child.' 0
Part II of this Note involves an exploration of the history of wrongful
as applied to fetuses. In Part III, wrongful death actions on behalf
statutes,
death
of unborn children in West Virginia will be discussed. In Part IV, the holding
and reasoning behind the decision in Farley will be presented. Part V criticizes
the Farley decision as being nothing more than a judicial "rewriting" of West
Virginia's wrongful death statute. Finally, in Part VI, this Note will be
concluded.

184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).
See infra note 28 for a list of the jurisdictions which allow a wrongful death action to be
maintained on behalf of a viable fetus.
466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
8 The phrase "nonviable fetus," as used throughout this Note, refers to a fetus that is not capable
of sustaining independent life outside the mother's womb, either by natural or artificial systems.
9 Farley, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
o Id. at 534. Prior to Farley, two jurisdictions allowed a cause of action to be maintained on
behalf of a nonviable fetus. See Shirley v. Bacon, 267 S.E.2d 809 (Ga. Ct. App. 1980) (permitting
recovery if an unborn child is "quick," meaning capable of moving, in its mother's womb); Connor
v. Monkem Co., 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (en bane) (permitting wrongful death action for unborn
child prior to viability). Furthermore, subsequent to Farley, South Dakota extended the protection
of its wrongful death statute to encompass a nonviable fetus. See, e.g.,Wiersma v. Maple Leaf
Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996). Thus, as of this writing, only four jurisdictions exist which
allow a wrongful death action to be maintained on behalf of a nonviable fetus.
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II. HISTORY OF WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES,
As APPLIED TO UNBORN CHILDREN

A.

The Rise and Fall of the "Single Entity" Theory

At common law, recovery for prenatal torts was generally not permitted,"
and courts were even less willing to allow wrongful death actions for unborns. 2
Courts routinely held that no duty could be owed to a person not yet in existence
at the time of the injury,'3 and that any injury to the fetus was compensable
through the mother. 4 The courts' rationale being that the mother and the fetus
were but one person (i.e., a "single entity"). 5 As the Supreme Court of Illinois
stated at the tum of the twentieth century in Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,'6 "'an
unbom child was but a part of the mother, and had no existence or being which
could be the subject-matter of injury distinct from the mother, and that an injury
to it was but an injury to the mother.""' 7 Thus, at common law, wrongful death
actions could not be maintained on behalf of unboms because they were not
deemed "independent entities" until birth.
However, after years of medical and scientific advancements which
See Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526 (citing Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14
(1884), overruled by Torigan v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d 926 (Mass. 1967)); see also
Agota Peterfy, Commentary, Fetal Viability As a Threshold to Personhood: A Legal Analysis, 16
J. LEGAL MED. 607 (1995) [hereinafter Peterfy].
12

See Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526 (citing Barbara E. Lingle, Comment, Allowing Fetal Wrongful

DeathActions in Arkansas: A Death Whose Time Has Come?, 44 ARK. L. REV. 465, 468 (1991));
see also Sharon Van Gundy, Note, Rhode Island's Fetal Tort Law: Viability DeterminesLegal
Personality of Fetus in Wrongful Death Cases, 27 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 425 (1993).
" See RESTATEMENT
"4

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 869 cmt. a (1977).

See Peterfy, supra note 11.

'3 Barbara E. Lingle, comment, Allowing Fetal Wrongful Death Actions in Arkansas:A Death

Whose Time Has Come?, 44 ARK. L. REV. 465, 468-69 (1991). Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
expressed the opinion that "the unborn infant was 'a part of the mother at the time of the injury'
and any damage to the infant 'which was not too remote' to deny recovery altogether was
recoverable by the mother." Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526 (citing Deitrich v. Inhabitants of
Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14, 17 (1884), overruled by Torigan v. Watertown News Co., 225 N.E.2d
926 (Mass. 1967)).
16

56 N.E. 638 (I11.1900), overruled by Amann v. Faidy, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953).

7 Id. at 641 (Boggs, J., dissenting); see also Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 527.
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enabled a fetus to exist independently of its mother prior to birth,' 8 the "single
entity" view eroded away. The start of this erosion occurred in 1946, when the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, in Bonbrest v. Kotz,' 9
became the first American court to depart from the "single entity" view. While
Bonbrest did not involve the wrongful death of an unborn, it was the first case
to acknowledge that viable unbors should be considered separate from the
mother for the purposes of tort recovery. 0 The district court held that an unborn
child, who suffers injuries wrongfully committed upon it while in a viable state,
should be allowed to maintain an action for such injuries if it is subsequently born
alive.2 The court reasoned that once a child is born alive, it should not be
considered part of the mother. Rather, a child should be considered a "person"
with standing to maintain an action for injuries inflicted upon it while in the
womb.22
Since Bonbrest, there has been all but universal change in the "single
entity" theory.' "Indeed, today, every jurisdiction permits recovery for prenatal
injuries if a child is born alive. 24 "[I]t generally does not matter whether the

"8 The point prior to birth at which the fetus is able to exist independently from its mother is
known as "viability." A "viable child" refers to an unborn child who is capable of independent
existence outside his or her mother's womb, either by natural or artificial life-supportive systems.
BLACK'S LAW DICIONARY 1566 (6th ed. 1990). Medical technology has advanced tremendously
since the times of the "single entity" view. As of mid-1995, the point of viability was placed at
nearly 23 weeks of fetal development See Darcy Frey, On the Border of Life, N.Y. TIMES MAG.,
July 9, 1995, at 29.
19 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
20 Id.
21

Id. at 142.

22 Id.at 140.
23

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS,

supra note 13, § 869 cmt. a. In fact, the Restatement

has codified this change in section 869(1), which states, "One who tortiously causes harm to an
unborn child is subject to liability to the child for the harm ifthe child is born alive." (emphasis
added).
24 Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 528 (W. Va. 1995)

(citing RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 869 App., note, subsection I at 79 (1982)). See, e.g., Wolfe v. Isbell, 280 So. 2d 758 (Ala.
1973); Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch, 79 A.2d 550 (Md. 1951); Keyes v. Constr. Serv. Inc., 165 N.E.2d
912 (Mass. 1960); Sinkler v. Kneale, 164 A.2d 93 (Pa. 1960); Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790
(S.C. 1960).
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injury occurred prior to or after the point of viability.
B.

25

CurrentStatus of Wrongful DeathActions on Behalfof Unborn Children

Although nearly every jurisdiction now permits recovery for prenatal
injuries where a child is born alive,26 courts have been less willing to extend
recovery for injuries that cause the death of unborn children. In 1949, Minnesota
became the first state to recognize a cause of action for wrongful death brought
on behalf of an unborn child.2 7 Since then, the majority of jurisdictions, thirtynine in all, have recognized such a cause of action. Of these thirty-nine
jurisdictions, thirty-five recognize wrongful death actions on behalf of viable
unborn children. 28 Within these thirty-nine jurisdictions exists the minority of
four jurisdictions which have gone the final step and recognized a wrongful death

25

Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 527 (W. Va. 1995); see also RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) Or

TORTS, supra note 12, § 869 cmt. d ("If the tortious conduct and the legal causation of the harm
can be satisfactorily established, there may be recovery for any injury occurring at any time aller
conception")
26

See supra note 23.

27 Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838 (Minn. 1949).

Wade v. United States, 745 F. Supp. 1573 (D. Hawaii 1990); Espadero v. Feld, 649 F. Supp.
1480 (D. Colo. 1986); Simmons v. Howard Univ., 323 F. Supp. 529 (D.D.C. 1971); Eich v. Town
of Gulf Shores, 300 So. 2d 354 (Ala. 1974); Summerfield v. Superior Court, 698 P.2d 712 (Ariz.
1985); Hatala v. Markiewicz, 224 A.2d 406 (Conn. 1966); Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 128
A.2d 557 (Del. 1956); Volk v. Baldazo, 651 P.2d 11 (Idaho 1982); Seef v. Sutkus, 583 N.E.2d 510
(Ill. 1991); Britt v. Sears, 277 N.E.2d 20 (Ind. 1971); Hale v. Manion, 368 P.2d I (Kan. 1962);
Rice v. Rizk, 453 S.W.2d 732 (Ky. 1970); Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981); Odham
v. Sherman, 198 A.2d 71 (Md. 1964); Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass.
1975); O'Neill v. Morse, 188 N.W.2d 785 (Mich. 1971); Verkennes v. Corniea, 38 N.W.2d 838
(Minn. 1949); Terrell v. Rankin, 511 So. 2d 126 (Miss. 1987); Strzelczyk v. Jett, 870 P.2d 730
(Mont. 1994); White v. Yup, 458 P.2d 617 (Nev. 1969); Wallace v. Wallace, 421 A.2d 134 (N.H.
1980); Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 619 P.2d 826 (N.M. 1980); DiDonato v. Wortman, 358 S.E.2d
489 (N.C. 1987); Hopkins v. MeBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Werling v. Sandy, 476 N.E.2d
1053 (Ohio 1985); Evans v. Olson, 550 P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 518
P.2d 636 (Or. 1974); Covelski v. Bubnis, 634 A.2d 608 (Pa. 1993); Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365
A.2d 748 (R-I. 1976); Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964); Nelson v. Peterson, 542
P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975); Vaillancourt v. Medical Ctr. Hosp. of Vermont, Inc., 425 A.2d 92 (Vt.
1980); Cavazos v. Franklin, 867 P.2d 674 (Wash. 1994); Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 148 N.W.2d 107 (Wis. 1967). Tennessee has amended its wrongful death statute to specify
that it includes the unborn. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 20-5-106(c) (1992).
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cause of action on behalf of nonviable unborn children29 - West Virginia now
being one of them with the Farley decision." Outside of the majority of thirtynine jurisdictions which permit wrongful death recovery for the unborn, a
minority of ten jurisdictions refuse to recognize that a wrongful death action may
be brought on behalf of an unborn child. 3'
Since the right to recover for the wrongful death of a person is a statutory
right,32 a plaintiffs ability to recover in a given state depends upon how the
courts in that state interpret their own wrongful death statute.33 The absence of
a fifty-state consensus on this issue stems from the courts' varying interpretations
of their own states' wrongful death statutes. In particular, the courts have
struggled to determine whether their legislature intended their wrongful death
statutes to include an unborn; and if so, whether the line should be drawn at
viability.
1.

Majority of Jurisdictions Recognize Wrongful Death Actions on
Behalf of Unborn Children

In order to justify holding that a wrongful death action may be maintained
on behalf of an unborn child, courts have had to search beyond the often nonexistent legislative intent by focusing upon the language of the statutes and the
goals and purposes behind their enactments.34 For example, in DiDonato v.

29

See, e.g., supra note 10.

" For a more detailed discussion on West Virginia's recognition of a wrongful death action on
behalf of nonviable children, see infra part IV.
31 See, e.g., Chatelain v. Kelley, 910 S.W.2d 215 (Ark. 1995); Justus v. Atchison, 565 P.2d 122
(Cal. 1977) (en banc); Hernandez v. Garwood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc.,
333 N.W.2d 830 (Iowa 1983); Milton v. Cary Medical Ctr., 538 A.2d 252 (Me. 1988); Smith v.
Columbus Community Hosp., Inc., 387 N.W.2d 490 (Neb. 1986); Giardina v. Bennett, 545 A.2d
139 (N.J. 1988); Endresz v. Friedberg, 248 N.E.2d 901 (N.Y. 1969); Blackman v. Langford, 795
S.W.2d 742 (Tex. 1990); Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969).
32

33

See infra part IV.
See Murphy S. Klasing, The Death of an Unborn Child: JurisprudentialInconsistencies in

Wrongful Death, CriminalHomicide, and Abortion Cases, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 933 (1995) [hereinafter
Klasing]; see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs, supra note 13, § 869 cmt. f.
14

Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 530 (W. Va. 1995).
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Wortman,35 the Supreme Court of North Carolina was asked to determine whether
its wrongful death statute allowed recovery for the death of a viable unborn
child. 36 Before addressing this issue, the court noted that there was no evidence
that its legislature had ever considered this problem. 37 With this in mind, the
court focused its inquiry on "the words of the statute itself, the public policies
underlying North Carolina's Wrongful Death Act, and common law principles
governing its application."3 8
The words of the North Carolina Wrongful Death Act read, in pertinent
part, "[w]hen the death of aperson is caused by wrongful act.., such as would,
if the injured person had lived, have entitled him to an action for damages
therefore, the person.. . that would have been so liable. . . shall be held liable
'
to an action for damages." 39
Thus, in order to answer the issue before it, the
DiDonato court had to determine whether the word "person" included a viable
fetus. After noting that the statute itself did not provide a clear-cut answer,40 the
court looked to case law from other jurisdictions.
After examining the case law of other jurisdictions, the DiDonato court
found that a viable fetus is generally considered to be among the class of
"persons" contemplated by the statutes' authors.4 In addition, the DiDonato
court decided that the legislative preamble to the most recent revision of the
North Carolina Wrongful Death Act was instructive on the definition of the word
"person."42 The preamble states that
WHEREAS, human life is inherently valuable; and
WHEREAS, the present statute is so written and construed that
damages recoverable from a person who has caused the death by

3 358 S.E.2d 489 (N.C. 1987).
36

Id. at 490.

37Id.
38 Id.

'9N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2(a) (1984) (emphasis added) (current version at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 28A-18-2(a) (1995 Supp.)).
40

DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 491.

41

Id. (citing Amadio v. Levin, 501 A.2d 1085, 1097-98 n.4 (Pa. 1985) (Zappala, J.,concurring)).

42

Id., 358 S.E.2d at 491.
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a wrongful act are effectively limited to such figure as can be
calculated from the expected earnings of the deceased, which is
far from an adequate measure of the value of human life.43
After determining that a viable fetus is undeniably human because it is capable
of life independent from its mother,44 the DiDonato court had no trouble in
holding that "although the face of the wrongful death statute does not
conclusively answer this question before us, case law concerning recovery for
fetal injuries and the amending legislation quoted above both point toward
acknowledging fetal personhood."45 Finally the DiDonato court used the statute's
broad remedial objectives (i.e., to deter dangerous conduct and provide
compensation to beneficiaries of the decedent's estate for their loss) to conclude
that "any uncertainty in the meaning of the word 'person' should be resolved in
favor of permitting an action to recover for the destruction of a viable fetus en
ventre sa mere."4 6
The DiDonato court's use of its statute's broad remedial objectives, and
the court's use of one of the statute's main goals - to deter dangerous conduct
is representative of the reasoning used by the majority of courts in this country
who have decided in favor of including a viable fetus within the meaning of their
wrongful death statutes.47 However, the reasoning used and the conclusions
reached by these courts have been criticized.
One of the main criticisms of the majority's interpretation of the word
"person" to include unborn children is that the courts are "judicially legislating"
by rewriting these statutes. 48 The minority of courts have refused to "judicially
legislate" by including an unborn child within the defintion of the word "person."

41 Id. (citing 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194) (preamble) (emphasis added).
14

Id. at 491.

45 DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 491-92.
4

Id. at 493. "En ventre sa mere" describes an unborn child "[i]n its mother's womb."

BLACK;S

LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 2, at 534.
4" See supra note 28; see also Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 530 (W. Va. 1995).
See, e.g., Fryover v. Forbes, 439 N.W.2d 284, 285 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (Weaver, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 446 N.W.2d 292 (1985); DiDonato, 358 S.E.2d at 497 (Webb, J., dissenting);
Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727 S.W.2d 503, 504-05 (Tex. 1987) (quoting
Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I. 1976) (Kelleher, J., dissenting)); Baldwin v.
Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 436-39 (W. Va. 1971) (Calhoun, J., dissenting).
41

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1996

9

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 99, Iss. 2 [1996], Art. 5
WEST VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:237

These courts have steadfastly required that a fetus be "born alive" before it is
entitled to recover.
2.

Minority of Jurisdictions Do Not Recognize Wrongful Death
Actions on Behalf of Unborn Children

Generally, the minority has refused to recognize wrongful death actions
on behalf of unborn children for two reasons. The first argument that has been
made is that wrongful death statutes were meant to transmit a cause of action for
personal injuries, which the decedent would have enjoyed had he not died, to his
personal representative. As applied to unboms, the argument goes that: Had the
unborn not died, he would not have had a right to a cause of action for personal
injuries. This being the case, the unborn can have no personal injury cause of
action to transmit; thus, the unborn cannot maintain an action in wrongful death.
For example, in Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co.,49 the Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia was asked to determine whether its wrongful death statute, which is
nearly identical to West Virginia's wrongful death statute, encompassed an action
for the wrongful death of a stillborn child.5" Virginia's wrongful death statute
reads, in pertinent part, that:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by the wrongful
act, neglect, or default of any person ... and the act. . . is such
as would, ifdeath had not ensued, have entitled the party injured
to maintainan action to recover damages in respect thereof, then
...the person who.., would have been liable, if death had not
ensued, shall be liable to an action for damages. 5
The Lawrence court held that their statute simply takes the right which
the decedent would have had to bring a personal injury suit, if death had not
ensued, and transmits that right to his personal representative.52 "Thus, if the
unborn child had no right, at the time of death, to maintain an action for personal
injuries, the right to maintain the present action could not be transmitted to her

49

169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969).

SoW. VA. CODE § 55-7-5 (1994); for the full text of this statute, see infra part V.A.
5' VA. CODE ANN.

§ 8.01-50 (Michie 1992) (emphasis added).

52 Lawrence, 169 S.E.2d at 441 (citing Anderson v. Hygeia Hotel Co., 24 S.E. 269 (Va. 1896);

Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Decatur, 3 S.E.2d 172 (Va. 1939) (dissenting opinion)).
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personal representative. 53 The Lawrence court was unwilling to hold that a child,
when it dies from injuries sustained while in its mother's womb, has a right to
maintain an action for those injuries.54 This being the case, the Lawrence court
held that an unborn could not maintain an action in wrongful death because it has
5
no cause of action for personal injury to transmit to its personal representative. 1
The court stated that if it were to hold otherwise, then "if such child were injured
and subsequently stillborn for reason wholly unrelated to the injuries, a right of
56
action would survive.,
The second argument relied upon by the minority of jurisdictions to
explain their refusal to allow a wrongful death action on behalf of an unborn
child is that their legislatures never intended for the word "person" or
"individual," as used in their statute, to encompass an unborn child.
For
example, in Witty v. American General Capital Distributors,Inc., the Supreme
Court of Texas was asked to determine whether its wrongful death statute
provided a cause of action for the death of a fetus.58 Prior to Witty, the Texas
Wrongful Death Act was codified to provide for "damages arising from an injury
that causes an individual's death." 59 The Witty court held that the legislature did
not intend the word "individual" to be construed as including an unborn child.6"
"' Lawrence, 169 S.E.2d at 441; see also Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc., 727

S.W.2d 503, 504-05 (Tex. 1987).
54

Lawrence, 169 S.E.2d at 441.

. Id.
5 Id.
E.g., Hogan v. McDaniel, 319 S.W.2d 221 (Tenn. 1958) (holding that to construe that an unborn
child is a "person" within the Tennessee wrongful death statute would be to create an additional
right under the guise of interpretation); Lawrence, 169 S.E.2d at 441 (stating that the word "person,"
when given its common, ordinary meaning, simply does not include an unborn child); Farley v.
Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 530 (W.Va. 1995) ("the Legislature should determine this issue and the
courts should not expand the scope of liability beyond what was contemplated when the [wrongful
death] statute was enacted.").
5

s 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987). Witty was later upheld. Blackman v. Langford, 795 S.W.2d 742
(Tex. 1990).

" Wity, 727 S.W.2d at 504 (quoting TEX. Ctv. PRAC. &REM.

CODE ANN.

§ 71.002(b) (West 1984)

(emphasis added)).
60 Id. at 504.
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In arriving at its conclusion, the Texas Supreme Court stated that:
although our wrongful death statute is remedial in nature and
must be liberally construed, we may not rewrite the statute in the
guise of construing it. We find nothing in the legislative history
to demonstrate an intent that an unborn fetus be embraced within
the scope of the statute. As the dissent so aptly stated in Presley
v. Newport Hospital, [d]espite the fact that "we have made great
strides in the field of the sciences and we have read with great
respect the writings of learned philosophers and theologians, we
must remember that such individuals cannot create a right of
action at law, for this is the job of the Legislature."'"
Thus, on the one hand, the majority of jurisdictions is willing to look past
the often non-existent legislative history of their statutes, and seek guidance from
medical and biological principles of when life begins in order to conclude that the
word "person" within their wrongful death statutes was intended to include
unborns. On the other hand, the minority of jurisdictions is unwilling to look to
scientific principles. Instead, the minority maintains that an action in wrongful
death must exist, if at all, from the wording of the statute itself, and until and
unless their legislature more clearly defines the word "person," unborn children
may not maintain an action for wrongful death.
III. WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS ON BEHALF OF
UNBORN CHILDREN IN WEST VIRGINIA

A.

West Virginia Adopts the Majority Position in Baldwin v. Butcher

Prior to 1971, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had not
addressed the issue of whether a cause of action under our wrongful death
statute62 could be maintained on behalf of an unborn child. However, in 1969,
in the case of Panagopoulous v. Martin, 63 the District Court for the Southern
District of West Virginia held that a viable unborn child was a "person" within

6" Id. at 504-05 (quoting Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I. 1976) (Kelleher, J.,

dissenting)).
62

W. VA. CODE § 55-7-5. For the full text of this statute, see infra part V.A.

63

295 F. Supp. 220 (S.D.W. Va. 1969).
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West Virginia's wrongful death statute.6 4
Two years later, in Baldwin v. Butcher,65 the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia first addressed the issue of whether the wrongful death statute
encompassed the unborn. West Virginia's wrongful death statute allows a
"person" to recover damages when he has been tortiously killed by a wrongful
act. 6 Because the right to maintain a wrongful death action is a statutory righ 7
the Baldwin court acknowledged that it had to determine whether a viable unborn
child was a "person" within the meaning of chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the
West Virginia Code.68 However, the court, rather than looking to the legislative
history of chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code, chose to
examine biological principles of when life begins and the decisions by the various
jurisdictions that have already been confronted with this issue.69
The Baldwin court found convincing the conclusion that a viable unborn
child is, biologically speaking, a presently existing person, a living human being,
capable of independent life apart from its mother. 7' Having recognized a viable
fetus as a living human being, capable of independent life apart from its mother,
the court "found no difficulty in holding that such a child is a 'person' within the
intendment of West Virginia's Wrongful Death Statute." 71
Criticism of Baldwin v. Butcher

B.

How the Baldwin court was able to ascertain our legislature's intendment
of the use of the word "person" by looking to "biological principles" of when life
begins was left unexplained; and the court's lack of explanation did not go
unnoticed, nor without criticism. In his dissenting opinion in Baldwin, Justice

64

Id. at 225.

65 184 S.E.2d 428 (W. Va. 1971).

6

W. VA. CODE

§ 55-7-5 (1994) (emphasis added). For the full text of this statute, see infra part

V.A.
67

See Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 429; see also Klasing, supra note 33.

68

Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 432.

69

Id. at 435.

70

Id. at 428.

71

id.
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Calhoun accused the majority of encroaching upon the legislative branch of our
government.7 2 After citing our state's constitutional provision dealing with the
separation of powers,73 Justice Calhoun stated that:
Our judicial function in this case is to determine what was the
intention of the legislative branches of government, in this State
and in Virginia, when our wrongful death statutes were enacted
so many years ago. More recent biological or medical concepts
of "viability" and comparatively recent court decisions
authorizing wrongful death actions to be predicated upon the
"wrongful death" of a fetus as a "person" cannot properly be
considered in determining the legislative intent involved in the
original enactment of statutes in this category. 74
Justice Calhoun was not persuaded that "biology" had a place in the
court's legal determination of what the legislature intended when it placed the
word "person" in the wrongful death statute back in the nineteenth century. 75 He
states that:
It makes no appeal to me to assert that, "biologically speaking"
or from a medical viewpoint, the fetus in question was a
"person." We are not concerned with the question from a
medical or biological viewpoint. The case presents a question of
law and not one of medical concept or of biology. From a legal
standpoint, it does not satisfy me to assert that the fetus was a
"child" merely because it had advanced to the state of "viability"
that would have permitted it . . . to leave the womb of the
mother and to live apart from her. The fact is that, when the
accident occurred, the fetus had no life apart from that of its
mother.76

72 Id. at 436-39 (Calhoun, J., dissenting).
73 W. VA. CONST. art. III,

§ 20.

74

Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 438-39 (Calhoun, J., dissenting).

15

Id. at 438.

76 id.
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Notwithstanding Justice Calhoun's criticism, the Baldwin decision placed West
Virginia in the majority of jurisdictions which recognized that a wrongful death
action may be maintained on behalf of a viable unbom child.77
IV. WEST VIRGINIA EXPANDS BALDWIN V. BUTCHER AND MOVES INTO THE
MINORITY OF JURISDICTIONS WITH FARLEY V. SARTIN

Baldwin remained the law of West Virginia until December of 1995,
when a unanimous Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia, in Farley v.
Sartin,"8 held that our wrongful death statute not only encompasses a viable fetus,
it also encompasses a nonviable fetus.7 9 The Farley decision made our State only
one of three jurisdictions in the country to recognize such a cause of action."0
In Farley, the issue presented was whether "the plaintiff [could] maintain
a cause of action under West Virginia's wrongful death statute, W. Va. Code,
section 55-7-5, for the death of Baby Farley, who was eighteen to twenty-two
weeks of gestation and, at best, of questionable viability."'" Although viability
was "questionable," the court chose to focus on whether a nonviable unbom child
is a "person" within chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code.
The court addressed only this issue.8"
The Farley court began its analysis by discussing the history of wrongful
death statutes.8 3 The court recognized that a cause of action for wrongful death
did not exist at common law, with the harsh result being that "tortfeasors, who
otherwise would have been liable for their victims' injuries, escaped all liability
when the injuries were severe enough to kill the victims."84 Thus, in order to
deal with this harsh result, the English Parliament passed the first wrongful death

77 See supra note 28.
7' 466 S.E.2d 522 (W. Va. 1995).
79

Id. at 534.

80 See supra note 10.
"' Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 523 (citation omitted).
82

Id. at 524.

"' Id. at 525-26.
4

Id. at 525.
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statute in 1846, commonly referred to as Lord Campbell's Act.85 The Farley
court then observed that although, West Virginia's wrongful death statute was first
passed in 1863, it "[is] the same in general purpose and effect as Lord Campbell's
Act. ,86
The court then proceeded to discuss the history of prenatal torts and
wrongful death of the unborn.8 7 Within this discussion, the court traced wrongful
death jurisprudence from the origins of the "single entity" view,88 to the near
89
complete destruction of the "single entity" doctrine.
Before delving into the case at hand, the Farley court analyzed the
reasons cited by those jurisdictions which still deny recovery for the wrongful
death of an unborn child,' and the reasons cited by those jurisdictions who permit
a wrongful death action to be maintained on behalf of a viable unborn child. 9
By analyzing the reasons cited on both sides of the issue, the Farley court was in
a better position to accept or reject those various reasons in reaching its
conclusion.
After citing the general reasons given by the courts which denied a
wrongful death cause of action to be maintained on behalf of an unborn child, the
Farley court proceeded to reject each one -- which was no surprise, considering
the fact that the court had already done this twenty-five years previously in
Baldwin.' On the other side of the issue, the Farley court proceeded to cite and

'5

FATAL ACCIDENTS ACTOF 1846, 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93 (1846).

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 526 (quoting Swope v. Keystone Coal & Coke Co. 89 S.E. 284, 286 (W.
Va. 1916) (citations omitted)).
17

Id. at 526-29.

Id. at 526-28 (explaining that the single entity view denied recovery to unboms who were
tortiously injured because they were not considered capable of separate, independent existence apart
from the mother); see also supra part II.A.
88

"' Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 528-29 (stating that the single entity doctrine was virtually destroyed as
a majority of jurisdictions began to recognize wrongful death actions on behalf of unborn children
who had already reached the point of viability); see also supra part ll.B.
90

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529-30.

9'Id. at 530-31.
' The four reasons cited by those jurisdictions who deny a wrongful death action on behalf of an
unborn child are: (1) a lack of precedent; (2) the single entity theory; (3) recognizing a wrongful
death action on behalf of the unborn would lead to fraudulent claims; and (4) the legislature should
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validate the reasons given by Baldwin for recognizing a cause of action on behalf
of viable unborns.93
After discussing the reasons cited by courts on both sides of the issue, the
Farley court finally turned to the issue of whether West Virginia would extend
Baldwin and recognize a cause of action for the tortious death of a nonviable
unborn child. The court began its analysis by stating that, although only two
jurisdictions permitted wrongful death recovery on behalf of a nonviable fetus,94
"a lack of precedent -- standing alone -- is an insufficient reason to deny a cause

of action.""5
Once the court made the decision not to be bound by the majority
position, the court felt itself free to develop and "construe ' 96 Chapter 55, article
7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code, which it did as liberally as possible. The
Farley court rejected the viability distinction and held that the term "person,"
within chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code, encompasses a
nonviable unborn child.97 One of the main reasons used by the Farley court to
extend Baldwin from fetuses to conception, was that
The societal and parental loss is egregious regardless of the state
of fetal development. Our concern reflects the fundamental value
determination of our society that life--old, young, and

determine this issue and the courts should not expand the scope of liability beyond what was
contemplated. Id. at 529-30. The Court rejected the first reason by simply stating that "there now,
however, is plenty of precedent." Id. at 529. In rejecting the second reason, the Court stated,
"However, through medical science and technology, we know that this reason lacks support, and
it too has been rejected by the majority of jurisdictions." Id. In response to the third reason, the
Court held that "[h]owever, courts generally have concluded that such risks do not justify a bar to
legitimate claims." Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 529. The Court rejected the final reason because "courts
have concluded that it is incumbent upon them to give meaning to the term 'person' as used in
wrongful death statutes and, in the absence of specific legislative language, that responsibility
requires courts to supplement the law." Id. at 530.
9' Id. at 530-3 1.

9' See supra note 9.
" Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 533.
The word "construe" is placed in quotes because Part V of this Note criticizes the Farley court
for judicially legislating and rewriting chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code in
the guise of "construing" it. See infra part V.
'6

9' Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534.
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prospective--should not be wrongfully taken away. In the
absence of legislative direction, the overriding importance of the
interest that we have identified merits judicial recognition and
protection by imposing the most liberal means of recovery that
our law permits.9 8
Given that there was a complete absence of legislative direction on the
definition of "person," the Farley court anticipated that it would be criticized for
its extension. In response to such anticipated criticism, the court stated that it was
its duty to "reach that decision which is most consistent with the purpose of the
wrongful death law and which best comports with our sense of justice. We
believe our holding meets that duty."99
The Farley court sought to forestall two other criticisms: (1) the
potential for fraudulent claims with the increased difficulty in proving causation;
and (2) the risk of interference with a woman's constitutional right to an
abortion.' 00 In response to the former line of criticism, the court reasoned that
while its decision may increase the potential for fraudulent claims and difficulty
in proving causation, "our holding in this case eliminates the need for trial courts
to decide . . . whether the fetus was 'viable." '0
The court quickly dispelled the second possible criticism by stating that
"[w]hile a fetus may not be a 'person' for the purposes of the fourteenth
amendment, it may be a 'person' for the purposes of a state's wrongful death
statute."'0 2 In clarification, the court stated that:
By definition, if a woman has a constitutional right to decide
whether to carry an unborn child to term or abort it, then the act
of aborting it is not tortious. In such cases, the reasons for
invoking the wrongful death statute do not apply as there is no

9'Id.at 533 (emphasis added).
99 Id.

at 534.

1o0
Id.
101 Id.

102

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534.
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tortious conduct to deter.103
Thus, with Farley, West Virginia moved from the Baldwin-majority
position of recognizing a wrongful death action on behalf of a viable fetus, and
into a minority position of recognizing a wrongful death action on behalf of a
fetus from conception until birth. This landmark decision has many implications
and will not go without criticism.
V. FARLEY COMPOUNDS THE PROBLEMS THAT BALDWIN CREATED

A.

West Virginia's Legislature Never Intended for Our Wrongful Death
Statute To Encompass Unborns, Viable or Not

As stated previously in this Note, wrongful death actions never existed
at common law.'0 4 The right to an action for wrongful death has always been a
statutory right. 05 Wrongful death became a statutory right in West Virginia in
1863,106 and, aside from periodic amendments "with respect to damages
recoverable,"'0 7 the statute has remained essentially the same to this da2. 8 Thus,
as acknowledged by both the Baldwin court in 1971 and the Farley court in 1995,
in order for a cause of action to exist for wrongful death, attention must be paid
to the language of the wrongful death statute itself and the goals and purposes

203

Id. at 535.

Other courts, such as the Supreme Court of South Dakota, have similarly

distinguished abortion and wrongful death, stating:
[Ihe use of abortion rights analysis, simply has no applicability here. A choice
to abort sanctions a mother's decision, not someone else's .... Clearly, a
pregnant woman who chooses to terminate her pregnancy and the defendant
who assaults a pregnant woman, causing the death of her fetus, are not similarly
situated. A woman consents to the abortion and has the absolute right, at least
during the first trimester of the pregnancy, to choose to terminate the pregnancy.
A woman has a privacy interest in terminating her pregnancy; however,
defendant has no such interest.
Wiersma v. Maple Leaf Farms, 543 N.W.2d 787, 791 (S.D. 1996).
104

See supra Part III.B.

105 Id.
106

Id.

207

Baldwin v.Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 429 (W. Va. 1971).

' See supra part III.
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behind its enactment. 0 9
The West Virginia Code provides, in pertinent part, that:
Whenever the death of aperson shall be caused by wrongful act,
.. . and the act... is such as would (if
death had not ensued)
have entitled the party injured to maintain an action to recover
damages in respect thereof, then ...

the person who ...

would

have been liable if death had not ensued, shall be liable to an
action for damages, notwithstanding the death of the person
injured, and although the death shall have been caused under
such circumstances as amount in law to murder in the first or
second degree, or manslaughter."'
Farley held that our legislature has not defined nor addressed the issue of whether
the word "person," within chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia
Code, includes unborn children."' However, according to the language of the
wrongful death statute itself, there are two reasons why the word "person" was
not intended to encompass unborn children."' The first reason is that our
legislature intended the word "person" to include anyone who could be the victim
of "murder in the first or second degree, or manslaughter.""' 3 The Farley court
did not address the issue of whether an unborn could be the victim of murder or
manslaughter in West Virginia.
In State ex rel. Atkinson v. Wilson,'"4 the Supreme Court of Appeals of
5
West Virginia did address the issue of whether West Virginia's murder statute"1

109

See Baldwin, 184 S.E.2d at 432; Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 530 (W. Va. 1995).

"10 W. VA. CODE

§ 55-7-5 (1994) (emphasis added).

. Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534.
112 W. VA.

CODE § 55-7-5.

113 Id.
11

332 S.E.2d 807 (W. Va. 1984).

"5 W. VA. CODE § 61-2-1 (1994). West Virginia's murder statute does not define the substantive
elements of murder; it merely categorizes the common law crimes of murder in order to set degrees
of punishment. State ex rel. Atkinson, 332 S.E.2d at 808 (quoting State v. Sims, 248 S.E.2d 834
(W. Va. 1978)). The West Virginia Code provides that:
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encompassed a thirty-seven week-old viable unborn child.'" 6 In State ex rel.
Atkinson, the court first noted that West Virginia's murder statute is not specific
on this point." 7 Thus, the State ex rel. Atkinson court had to rely on common
law principles to reach its conclusion. The common law rule, of which the vast
majority of courts are in agreement, provides that "in the absence of legislation
to the contrary, the killing of an unborn child cannot be the basis for a charge of
murder.""' Because chapter 61, article 2, section 1 of the West Virginia Code
did not provide to the contrary, the issue before the court was whether it had the
authority to alter the common law rule.'
The State ex rel. Atkinson court,
finding that the legislature had the sole right to define crimes and their
punishments, 2 held that "neither our murder statute . . . nor its attendant
common law principles authorize prosecution of an individual for the killing of
a viable unborn child. This matter must be left to the good judgment of the
legislature, which has the primary authority to create crimes.' 12' Thus, in State
ex rel. Atkinson, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia determined that
the legislature did not intend for our murder statute to encompass a viable unborn
child.
State ex rel. Atkinson demonstrates that the legislature could not have
intended the word "person," within the wrongful death statute, to include an
unborn child because the legislature never intended the murder statute to
encompass an unborn child. While the Baldwin court could not have anticipated
that the State ex rel. Atkinson court would hold that chapter 61, article 2, section

Murder by poison, lying in wait, imprisonment, starving, or by any willful,
deliberate and premeditated killing, or in the commission of, or attempt to
commit, arson, kidnaping, sexual assault, robbery, burglary, breaking and
entering, escape from lawful custody, or a felony offense of manufacturing or
delivering a controlled substance as defined in article four, chapter sixty-a of
this Code, is murder of the first degree. All other murder is murder of the
second degree.
W. Va. Code § 61-2-1.
116 State ex

reL Atkinson, 332 S.E.2d at 807.

117

Id.

"

Id. at 809 n. 3 (citations omitted).

"9

Id. at 809.

20 Id. at 808-11.

121

Id. at 812.
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1 of the West Virginia Code does not encompass the murder of an unborn child,
the Farley court failed to address State ex rel. Atkinson and carried Baldwin
22
another step further.
The second reason why the legislature did not intend the word "person,"
within chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code to include
unborn children is that the unborn cannot maintain an action for personal injuries
"if death does not ensue.' 1 23 The Farley court interprets chapter 55, article 7,
section 5 of the West Virginia Code, as most jurisdictions interpret their wrongful
death statutes, by asking whether the unborn child would have been able to
maintain a cause of action ifit had been born alive.'24 Asking the question in
these terms makes the Farley court's interpretation a little easier to swallow,
because once a fetus is born alive, then the fetus becomes a "person" by anyone's
definition. However, taking the statute at face value, the correct question to ask
is whether a nonviable fetus, or even a viable fetus, could have maintained a
cause of action for personal injuries if it had not died as a result of the tortious
act committed upon it. The answer is doubtful. 25 A related question is whether

122

What is interesting about the Farley court's disregard of State ex rel. Atkinson is that such

disregard was directly in the face of the court's use of the fact that our legislature provides
protection to the unborn in other areas of the law. The Farley court stated that it observed in
Baldwin that the "law confers significance on the unborn's existence in other contexts: 'An unborn
child possesses certain rights at common law,' including having a legacy, guardian, and estate."
Farley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 532 (W. Va. 1995) (quoting Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428,
435 (W. Va. 1971)).
Thus, while the Farley court partly justified its decision based upon the reasoning that our
legislature provides protection to the unborn in other areas of the law, such as property, the Farley
court completely ignored the fact that the legislature does not provide protection to the unborn in
the context of criminal law. One would think that an examination of West Virginia's criminal law,
as applied to the unborn, would be of significance to the Farley court. If West Virginia does not
criminally punish third parties for intentionally killing a viable fetus, it appears illogical to punish
third parties for unintentionally killing a nonviable fetus in a civil proceeding.
113

W. VA. CODE,

114

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 530-31.

125

Justice Calhoun, in his dissent in Baldwin, states that:

§ 55-7-5.

Assume that the "viable unborn child" involved in this case had not died until
a month after he sustained the personal injuries which are alleged to have been
wrongfully caused by the defendants. Could it be asserted with any semblance
of'justification that, during the one-month interval of time, the 'viable unborn
child' was a 'person' who had a cause of action against the defendants for the
personal injuries he had sustained? The obvious, unassailable answer is in the
negative. It inevitably follows, therefore, that an action for wrongful death,
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a fetus, who survived a tortious injury received at ten weeks, only to be stillborn
six months later from a wholly unrelated cause, would be able to maintain an
action for the first injury? Again, it is doubtful. 2 6 However, the Farley decision
would make recovery plausible in such a situation.
Thus, if the word "person," within chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the
West Virginia Code, is going to be construed by the judiciary, that word should
be construed consistent with its meaning in other statutes, which is to say that it
was not intended to encompass the unborn, viable or not. Any ambiguity in
chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code, should be resolved, not
by "rewriting" the statute, but by looking at what little guidance the legislature
has given. The Baldwin court did not examine the language of chapter 55, article
7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code in reaching its conclusion, 2 7 and the
Farley court merely compounded that error by not only refusing to reverse
Baldwin, but by taking Baldwin a step further and allowing a wrongful death
action to be maintained on behalf of nonviable fetuses. 8
B.

South Dakota's LegislatureDid Intendfor Its Wrongful Death Statute to
Encompass Unborns, Viable and Nonviable

The recent decision by the Supreme Court of South Dakota, in Wiersma
v. Maple Leaf Farms,"9 illustrates the proper role that the judiciary should play
in interpreting wrongful death statutes. As in Farley, the issue in Wiersma was
whether its legislature intended its wrongful death statute to include a nonviable
fetus. 30 Like Farley, the Wiersma court held that its wrongful death statute was

based wholly on the pertinent statute, cannot be maintained in this case.
Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 438 (W. Va. 1971) (Calhoun, J., dissenting).
Cf. Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 169 S.E.2d 440 (Va. 1969). The Supreme Court of Appeals
of Virginia, after interpreting its wrongful death statute, which is nearly identical to West Virginia's,
rejected a wrongful death action on behalf of unboms because it believed that to hold otherwise
would mean that "if such child were injured and subsequently stillborn for reason [sic] wholly
unrelated to the injuries, a right of action would survive." Id. at 441.
126

127

See supra part III.A.

121

See supra part IV.

129

543 N.W.2d 787 (S.D. 1996).

13o Id.
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intended to encompass a nonviable fetus.' 3 ' However, unlike in Farley, the
Supreme Court of South Dakota reached its conclusion by interpreting a wrongful
death statute which specifically included the unborn.132 South Dakota's wrongful
death statute states that:
Whenever the death or injury of a person, including an unborn
child, shall be caused by a wrongful act.., and the act... is
such as would have entitled the party injured to maintain an
action and recover damages in respect thereto, if death had not
ensued, then ...the person who would have been liable, if death
33
had not ensued, . . . shall be liable.
In 1984, the South Dakota legislature amended the above statute by
replacing the word "person" with the phrase "including an unborn child."' 3"
Before the amendment, the Supreme Court of South Dakota interpreted the word
"person" to include a viable fetus. 35 Thus, the Wiersma court correctly
determined that "[t]o now interpret 'unborn child' to mean only a viable fetus
would result in the amendment adding nothing to the term 'person,' and would
negate the
legislative purpose of expanding the class of persons covered by the
136
statute.'

While the Supreme Court of South Dakota may have done a little
"rewriting" of its wrongful death statute prior to the 1984 amendment, like the
Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had done in Baldwin in 1971, the
Wiersma court did not overstep its bounds after the 1984 amendment. Had the
South Dakota legislature not replaced the word "person" with "unborn children"
in its wrongful death statute, it is unlikely the Wiersma court would have reached
the same conclusion as the Farley court. The Wiersma court stated, "We
acknowledge a majority of jurisdictions decline to recognize wrongful death
actions for children in utero before viability. Yet none of these authorities

'3' Id.at

791.

132

Id.

133

S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-5-1 (1984) (emphasis added).

134Wiersma, 543 N.W.2d at 790.

See In re Certification of Question of Law from U.S. Dist. Court, Dist. of South Dakota,
Southern Division (Wiersma), 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986).
133

136

Wiersma, 543 N.W.2d at 790.
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interpret a term similar to 'unborn child,' but instead consider whether a
nonviable child in utero falls within the definition of 'person,' 'minor child,'
'natural person,' or 'one.""..37 Thus, the Wiersma court did not judicially
"rewrite" South Dakota's wrongful death statute.
VI. CONCLUSION

Should West Virginia define the word "person," within chapter 55, article
7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code to include a fetus from conception until
birth? Maybe. Should the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia be the
governmental branch to make that decision? Absolutely not. Assuming, like the
Farley court did, that our society has made a "fundamental value determination
. . . that life--old, young, and prospective--should not be wrongfully taken
away,"'1 38 then it must also be assumed that our legislators should be the ones who
turn that "value determination" into law, not our judicial officers.
Judicial officers are elected for the purpose of construing the laws that our
legislators make and not for writing legislation. The Farley court advocated just
the opposite. After it had already "rewritten" chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of
the West Virginia Code to impose liability upon a tortfeasor for a wrong which
our legislature never contemplated,139 the Farley court asked our legislators to
help construe the statute, by stating: "Although we have answered the question
presented to this court given the current language in our wrongful death statute,
we strongly encourage the Legislatureto define the word 'person' to deal with
future problems that may arise .

,,140 With this statement, the Farley court

appears to realize that it "rewrote" chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West
Virginia Code. Also with this statement, the Farley court seems to be indicating
that it had to "rewrite" chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code
in order to force our legislature's hand; to force our legislature into doing what

'17

Id. at 790 (citations omitted).
Parley v. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522, 533 (W. Va. 1995); see also supra part IV.
F3'

Farley, 466 S.E.2d at 534 ("[l]t is clear from the statute that the Legislature has not confronted
F
the issue we must decide here .... ). It should also be noted that the criticisms expressed in this
part of the Note, dealing with "judicial legislation," are meant to be aimed at the Supreme Court
of Appeals of West Virginia's decision in Baldwin, because that case marked the first step that West
Virginia took in "rewriting" chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code. Farley
simply adds the finishing touches to the "new" chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia
Code.
140

Id. at 535 (emphasis added).
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it should have done after the Baldwin decision in 1971 (i.e., define the word
"person.")
However, "rewriting" statutes in order to force our legislature's hand is
not the within our judiciary's power. The Farley court has overstepped its
bounds and has "rewritten" chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia
Code, "in the guise of construing it."'' As Justice Calhoun stated in his dissent
in Baldwin when he sought to defeat West Virginia's acceptance of wrongful
death actions on behalf of viable unboms, "[b]y a labored judicial pronouncement,
in a shocking disregard of judicial functions and prerogatives, this court has now
amended and added to a clear statute which has been in existence since the
formation of our state.', 142 The concerns that Justice Calhoun had back in 1971
about the Baldwin court "rewriting" our wrongful death statute are just as
applicable to the Farley court's decision to "rewrite" that statute even further in
1995. Until and unless our legislature more clearly defines the word "person,"
within chapter 55, article 7, section 5 of the West Virginia Code, there should be
no cause of action in West Virginia for the wrongful death of an unborn child,
viable or otherwise.

41

142

Presley v. Newport Hosp., 365 A.2d 748, 756 (R.I. 1976) (Kelleher, J., dissenting).
Baldwin v. Butcher, 184 S.E.2d 428, 439 (Calhoun, J., dissenting).
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